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21. Introduction
Technological progress is driven by individuals’ self interested attempts to profit from their inge-
nuity. These innovations do not materialize from thin air; they are the result of costly investments,
often requiring extensive specialized technical knowledge and much accumulated skill. However,
thedesiretopushforwardtheknowledgefrontierisnottheprimarymotivationforhouseholdinvest-
ments in human capital. In fact, people typically acquire skills to enable themselves to implement
technologies that already exist. New technologies expand the set of what can be feasibly produced
and generate incentives for people to acquire new skills. Similarly, skill acquisition reduces the
costs of implementing existing technologies and generates incentives for new technologies to be
developed.
Although both innovation and skills are widely recognized as being important factors in the
growth process, the recent growth literature leaves two important questions largely unanswered.
First, what is the relative importance of technological progress versus human capital formation in
driving sustained productivity growth? Second, how do these two forms of knowledge accumu-
lation endogenously interact in driving productivity growth? Early endogenous growth theories
focussed on either innovation or human capital as the primary engine of growth. More recently,
growing evidence of strong complementarity between new technology and skill (e.g. Bartel and
Lichtenberg, 1987, Goldin and Katz, 1998) has motivated a greater emphasis on the interaction be-
tween technological change and human capital accumulation. However, in most cases, only one of
these forces can be thought of as the primary engine of endogenously sustainable growth. The other
is either exogenous or is driven by direct ‘‘spillovers’’ from the primary engine.1
Although technology and skills arecomplementary, it is clear that there arelimits to this relation-
ship. In particular, that simply combining an increasingly educated labor force with a fixed set of
technologies could enhance labor productivity without bound seems implausible. In this paper, we
construct a model in which skills and technologies are bounded complements at the aggregate level
— they are complements up to a point, but the marginal productivity of each factor is ultimately
constrained by the level of the other. Complementarity generates endogenous interactions between
technology, skills and growth that we argue are broadly consistent with the evidence. The fact that
￿ We discuss the associated literature in more detail below.
1thiscomplementarityisbounded implies that growthcannotproceedwithouttechnicalprogressand
aggregate human capital accumulation. Moreover, in contrast to previous analyses, our approach
allows us to accommodate the observed complementarity between technology and skills in a model
in which both engines of growth are truly endogenous.2
Our model features continuously overlapping generations of agents who must acquire skills to
both implement and invent technologies. Skills can be acquired in two ways: by investing in edu-
cation and training, and by learning while on the job.3 Because knowledge learned on–the–job is
specialized and cannot be transferred costlessly to new generations (even between members of the
same household), there is an endogenous demand for education as a vehicle for transferring skills
between generations. A dynamic externality arises because educational investments transform pre-
viously specialized knowledge into general knowledge that can be costlessly transferred to future
generations. However, education is not primarily a source of new knowledge. New technologies
arise as a result of profit–seeking innovative activities by agents whose productivity in the intro-
duction of new ideas and technologies requires high levels of specialized skill some of which is
acquired through work experience.4 Thus, we distinguish between frontier knowledge, generated
by the innovation sector, and the knowledge embodied in humans, acquired through education and
experience.
The endogenous growth process that arises has several key predictions for the interactions be-
tween technological progress, human capital accumulations and productivity growth:
 Technological change is necessary for sustained growth in per capita income —I nm o d e l so f
endogenous growth based solely on human capital accumulation (e.g.. Lucas, 1988), human capital
raises the productivity of the available fixed technology and grows without bound. In our model,
human capital accumulation may raise aggregate productivity to a limited extent, by relaxing skill
constraints on the efficient use of technologies, but growth cannot be sustained without the intro-
duction of new technologies.
In an influential article, Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) claim that most (around 80%) of the
international variation in per capita incomes can indeed be explained by differences in physical and
￿ That is, where both are driven by private incentives to allocate labor effort away from production.
￿ The absorption of knowledge is privately and publicly costly (see Jovanovic, 1997). Mincer (1994) estimates that schooling costs are over 10%
of US GNP , whereas job training and learning costs are approximately 3%.
￿ As Jovanovic (1997, p. 329) notes, ‘‘ ... it is by now clear that more educated and more skilled workers have a comparative advantage in
implementing new technology.’’
2human capital alone. However, more recent evidence suggests that this claim is exaggerated. For
example, Klenow and Rodriguez–Clare (1997) show that the result is sensitive to the definition of
the human capital variable. Moreover, Howitt (2000) shows that the assumption that productivity
differences are uncorrelated with investment rates is generally invalid and leads them to overesti-
mate the impact of physical and human capital. Another kind of evidence casting doubt on the view
that productivity differences are determined by human capital alone is that workers with apparently
similar human capital levels have widely different productivities in different countries (see Trefler,
1995 and Hendricks, 1999).5
 Growth in the aggregate stock of human capital is necessary for sustained growth in per capita
income — In models of endogenous growth based solely on innovation (e.g. Romer, 1990, Gross-
man and Helpman, 1991 and Aghion and Howitt, 1992), new technologies raise the productivity
of a given stock of human capital and do so without bound. In our model, the frontier knowledge
generatedbytheR&Dsectorisnotimmediatelyandcostlesslyimplementable,andonlysufficiently
skilled workers are productivein R&D. As a result, theaggregate stock of human capital must grow
in order to sustain the profitable introduction of new technologies in the long run.
Early empirical studies (e.g. Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994), using average years of schooling
in the working population as a measure of the stock of human capital, seem to support the view
that the initial level of human capital and not its growth determines productivity growth. However,
more recently, several authors (e.g. Bils and Klenow 1999, Jones 1996) have argued that it is more
reasonable to interpret years of schooling as a measure of the investment in human capital rather
than the stock itself. Moreover, recent empirical work (e.g. Krueger and Lindahl, 2000) has found
modelling the relationship between human capital and schooling along the lines of Mincerian wage
regressions results in a preferable specification. Our model of human capital formation mirrors that
of Bils and Klenow (1999) — an individual’s human capital depends on the time spent in school
and acquiring experience, as in the Mincerian model.
 Rapid technological change generates high net returns to skill which in turn generates invest-
ment in education and training — Complementarity between skills and new technologies implies
that more rapid innovation drives up anticipated future earnings relative to the current opportunity
￿ Although this prediction would also arise in human capital based models that include an aggregate externality, recent evidence (e.g. Acemoglu
and Angrist, 1999 and Heckman and Klenow 1997), suggests that such an externality is unlikely to be large.
3costs of labor effort in education. It is this disparity which stimulates the increased investment in
education necessary to support greater technological progress in the long run.
Nelson and Phelps (1966) argue that when human capital lags technology growth this will gen-
erate a ‘‘catch up’’ process whereby human capital grows more rapidly.6 In our model, this ‘‘catch
up’’ effect arises endogenously in response to the incentives generated by increased wage disper-
sion. The feedback effect from technical progress to human capital accumulation is consistent with
numerous pieces of evidence. First, the feature that more rapid technical change generates rising
returns to skill is consistent with recent experience in the U.S. (see Berman, Bound and Griliches
1994)andothercountries(e.g. FosterandRosenzweig1996,BartelandLichtenberg1987). Second,
there is also evidence that agents do respond to such incentives, although there are often ‘‘bottle-
necks’’. At the micro level, Mincer (1994) argues that ‘‘in both analyses of school education and of
job training, the evidence shows that investments in human capital respond positively to profitabil-
ity.’’7 At the macro level, Heckman and Klenow (1997) argue that countries that have high levels
of schooling do so because of high levels of technology.8
 Rapid skill accumulation generates high net returns to innovation which in turn generates in-
vestment in R&D — Complementarity also implies that faster human capital growth lowers future
production costs relative to current production costs, thereby raising the future returns to innova-
tion relative to the current opportunity cost of the labor effort used in R&D. It is this disparity that
stimulates the increase in innovation necessary to make human capital accumulation valuable in the
long run.
Goldin and Katz (1999) document that the slowdown in the growth rate of skilled relative to
unskilled labor in the US between the 1970s and 1980s was a key contributor to the increase in
the skill premium.9 Relatedly, Lloyd–Ellis (1999) argues that the slowdown in the growth rate of
average educational attainment experienced in the US after 1970 was responsible for the rise in the
returns to unobserved skill, and that this led to a slowdown in the rate of innovation. Through this
￿ In a similar reduced form way, Jones (1996) exhibits this catch up feature.
￿ He adds ‘‘Yet the supply of the accumulated stock has not as yet (1991) begun to reduce current profitabilities which are high by historical
standards. Lags in the educational pipeline, growing costs, and perverse demographics represent delays and impediments to timely supply effects.
It is also very likely that the poor performance of elementary and high school students represents a major bottleneck for the supply adjustment.’’
Mincer (1994, p. 5)
￿ When they include lifespan in a macro–Mincer regression, as a proxy for future income, they find that it accounts for much of the impact on
output — that is, macro regressions attribute too large an output affect to schooling.
￿ They argue that technological change has been skill biased throughout this century and find no evidence that it has accelerated in recent decades.
4channel, technological progress is intimately related to the extent to which the knowledge dissem-
inated by the education system lags behind the frontier knowledge generated by the R&D sector.
Rosenberg(2000), forexample, arguesthatthepost–wargrowth successoftheU.S.relativetoother
countries was related to the responsiveness of its universities to the technological frontier in both
subject matter and curriculum.10
Our model also has several other implications which we discuss in the paper. First, while the
existence of two engines of growth expands the menu of growth–enhancing policy instruments, the
effectivenessofeachinstrumentisreduced. Second,ourmodelsuggestsanalternativeinterpretation
of the findings of Bils and Klenow (1999) regarding the causal relationship between schooling and
per capita GDP growth. Our model also endogenizes the so called ‘‘catch–up’’ effect posited by
Nelson and Phelps (1966) and Jones (1999), provides a simple interpretation of the relationship
between growth and intergenerational wage dispersion, and highlights the various roles of lifespan
in determining schooling decisions.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We conclude this section with a summary of
the related literature, distinguishing our contribution from others. In Section 2, we develop a model
of production with minimum skill–requirements and an endogenous skill distribution. In Section
3, we embed this production structure in a dynamic general equilibrium model and characterize
the resulting steady–state growth paths. In Section 4, we detail the implications of the model for
the effectiveness of growth policy and the interpretation of the results of recent empirical work on
cross–country growth. In Section 5, we show how the model can be generalized to allow for rising
intermediate quality, positive population growth and a capacity to absorb new ideas that declines
with age. Section 6 contains some concluding remarks.
1.1 Related Literature
Using a similar structure of minimum skill requirements to ours, Stokey (1991) develops a model
of technology adoption driven by the endogenous accumulation of human capital. Lucas (1993)
and Parente (1994) develop related adoption models which emphasize the role of experience with
existingtechnologiesasanadoption cost.ParenteandPrescott(1994)demonstratethepotentialrole
￿￿ He argues (p. 46) that ‘‘... intellectual innovations were introduced into US universities with remarkable speed, where they were further system-
ized and entered into the teaching curriculum as soon as their potential utility become apparent.’’
5of adoption costs in accounting for cross-country growth experiences. However, these models as-
sume an exogenous menu of existing productive technologies, and have no role for an independent
sector that generates these technologies.11 In a model featuring endogenous technological change,
Y oung (1995) also emphasizes the importance of skill accumulation in implementing newtechnolo-
gies. However, because he assumes that labor learns serendipitously about technologies, neither the
private incentives for human capital accumulation, nor the costs of absorption can be explored.
Grossman and Helpman (1991, ch. 5) extend Romer’s (1990) model by endogenizing the level
of human capital. However, in their framework the schooling decision is independent of the rate
of innovation. The idea that the rate of technical change affects the incentives to acquire skills is
emphasized by Chari and Hopenhayn (1991), Greenwood and Y orukoglu (1997), Violante (1998),
and Caselli (1999). However, in these models, technological change is exogenous. Eicher (1996),
Galor and Tsiddon (1998) and Galor and Moav (1998) develop two–period OLG models in which
technological change is a pure spillover from human capital accumulation by previous generations.
However, in these models private incentives to invent do not matter. Aghion and Howitt (1998)
develop a model in which the accumulation of physical/human capital and innovation can be inter-
preted as twin engines of growth.12 However, theirformulationrequires a humancapital production
technology identical to that of other goods (as in Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992). In contrast, we
follow the recent growth literature (e.g. Jones 1996, Bils and Klenow 1999) by modeling human
capital formation in a way that is consistent with the Mincerian model.
In response to Jones’ (1995) critique that there is no ‘‘scale effect’’, several authors (e.g. Smul-
ders and van de Klundert 1995, Y oung 1998, Howitt 1999, Segerstrom 1999) have now developed
new variants of the ideas–based growth models in which the rate of technological change depends
on the growth rate rather than the level of human capital (i.e. population). However, in these
models this growth rate of human capital is exogenous. An exception is that of Arnold (1999)
who extends Sergestrom’s (1999) model, by introducing a Lucas–type human capital accumulation
process. However, his model does not feature any of the interactions between technological change
and human capital emphasized here.
￿￿ Moreover, the rate of adoption does not respond to changes in the rate of technological change.
￿￿ They assume that new technologies are increasingly capital intensive and that innovation becomes increasingly costly over time.
62. Technological Change and Skill Acquisition as Bounded Complements
In this section, we develop a model of production with minimum skill requirements and an endoge-
nous skill distribution. We characterize the resulting labor market equilibrium taking theallocations
of labor effort to education and R&D as exogenously given. We show that the interaction between
skills and technology at the aggregate level exhibits bounded complementarity and detail the impli-
cations of this for growth. In Section 3, we endogenize both labor allocations and characterize the
self–sustaining balanced growth path.
2.1 Production and the Demand for Skills
Time, indexed by , is continuous. A single final good is produced by a continuum of industries,
indexed by   . For each industry  there is a continuum of actual and potential ideas and
technologies indexed by   . All technologies    are actual technologies
that can be used in production in industry . In industry , competitive firms use intermediate goods
and services, each of which uses one of the actual technologies currently available. Intermediates
are used within each industry according to the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production
function
 








   and  is the quantity of the intermediate used in industry  whose production
requirestechnology. Intermediateinputproducersspecializeingoodsandservicessoldtoindustry
. They have infinitely–lived patents over their intermediate good and are monopolists in output
markets. However, they must compete against intermediate producers supplying other industries
for labor with the same skill requirement. One unit of labor with skill ￿  , can produce one unit
of intermediate .13
Profit maximization by final goods producers yields constant elasticity demand functions for





nature of the results (see Section 5).
7Whateverthequantityoflaborhired,intermediateproducersearnmonopolyprofitsbysettingprices
at a mark–up over the competitive wage:
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It follows that the derived demand for labor from the production of intermediates that require at
















Following Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991), we assume that the introduction
of new productive technologies per unit time in industry ,  ,i se q u a lt o ￿    ￿   ,w h e r e
is a productivity parameter, ￿ is the measure of labor employed in R&D, and ￿ is the
cumulative stock of industry–specific knowledge in the innovative activity. The latter is assumed
to equal ,s ot h a t     ￿        In equilibrium, all industries are identical, so we simplify










￿ ￿	. As in Lloyd–Ellis (1999), we assume that only those workers who have
acquired the skills necessary to implement at least the most recently introduced technology 
are productive in the R&D sector. We let 
￿ denote the wage paid to agents working in the R&D
sector.
2.2 Households and the Supply of Skills
The economy is populated by a measure  continuum of infinitely–lived households. Each house-
hold is composed of an infinite stream of continuously overlapping generations. Each generation is
the same size, and each individual lives for  units of time. Hence, the size and demographic com-
position of the population are constant over time and size of the population is .14 Workers are
distinguished by the range of technologies that they are capable of implementing. This capability
is cumulative: to acquire the skills needed to implement technology ￿, a worker must be able to
implement all technologies   ￿   . We therefore index a worker’s skill by the most recently
￿￿ The model can be adapted to allow for population growth without changing any of the results (see Section 5).
8learned technology.
2.2.1 Education and Intergenerational Knowledge Transfer
AsinStokey(1991)andBilsandKlenow(1999)theskillsacquiredthroughschoolingareafunction
of the time spent in school and a positive externality from the investments in knowledge made by
previous generations. Specifically, we assume that an agent who spends  periods in school and
graduates at time  acquires a skill level given by







and  denotes the skill level of the generation that graduated  periods earlier. In effect we
assume that teachers are  periods older than their students. The function  is the same as that
discussed by Bils and Klenow (1999), and the parameters ,  and  reflect the ease with which
knowledge is transferred between generations.15
If schooling is constant for all cohorts, the minimum skill level in the labor force (i.e. that of the








2.2.2 On–the–Job Learning and Specialization
Upon graduation, workers have the capacity to implement technologies requiring a level of skill
  . However, higher level skills     represent industry–specific knowledge that
must be acquired on the job.16 We assume that the measure of industry–specific skills that can be
acquired per period on–the–job is limited by the worker’s range of skills at time :
  (9)
Thus workers’ absorptive capacities — the rate at which they can absorb new ideas — are assumed
￿￿ In Section 3, we derive restrictions on these parameters that ensure the existence of a unique optimal schooling choice.
￿￿ The learning we emphasize here is learning about new technologies, not learning to become more productive with a given technology as empha-
sized by Lucas (1993), Parente (1994) and Y oung (1995).
9to be identical across industries. These specialized skills are not transferrable to future generations
except through the education system. As a consequence,  is not exogenously driving growth.
Indeed, the fact that agents learn and acquire skills while working does not, on its own, result in a
positive aggregate growth rate — the skills being learned are already known by others. However,
on–the–job learning does play a key role in determining the incentives to acquire human capital and
is crucial for the existence of an equilibrium balanced growth path.17
2.2.3 The Distribution of Skills
Consideragrowthpathalongwhichtheratesofchangeoffrontierknowledge,,andoftransferrable
knowledge, , are constant and have been for some time. The time  skill level of a worker with
experience    is
	
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ (10)
where  is the human capital of the cohort who graduate at time . It follows that the time 
distribution of skills has support  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. A change of variable yields that the skill
distribution is given by
 
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The fact that the density is declining in skill reflects the fact that more specialized skills are rela-
tively scarce. Since skills accumulate exponentially, more experienced cohorts become more finely
divided across tasks or more specialized within their industries.18
2.3 Labor Market Equilibrium







￿	    " (13)
￿￿ In Section 5, we discuss how the model can be generalized to allow for learning to slow with age.
￿￿ With rising intermediate productivity, more experienced workers would become more productive as well as more specialized (see Section 5).
10where"denotesthetotallaborforce. Therestrictionthatonlythoseworkerswithskilllevelsgreater
than  can be used in the R&D sector implies that the rate of innovation is bounded from above by
the proportion of such agents:
￿    "    (14)
where   is the distribution of skills in the labor force at time  The equilibrium wage of these






In addition, the market for each skill level must clear. The following Proposition gives the implied
conditions:
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"! if   ##
"!# if   #￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
(16)







"  " #
  #
(18)
This equilibrium characterization is discussed in some detail by Lloyd–Ellis (1999). Briefly,
given that the steady–state skill distribution is single–peaked, as long as the supply of workers at
a particular skill level, , exceeds the available supply at lower skill levels,  averaged over
lower skill markets, the competitive wage for that skill level cannot rise above that of lower skill
levels. Similarly,solongasthesupplyofworkersataparticularskilllevel,islessthantheavailable
supply of higher skill levels￿￿￿￿￿￿ averaged over higher skill markets, the competitive wage
for that skill level cannot fall below that of higher skill levels. Equations (17) and (18) define two
critical skill levels # and #where ## such that for all #and for all #wages
do not rise with skill. Between these two critical skill levels, the wage rises with  reflecting the
increasing scarcity of specialized skills.
At any point in time, the labor market equilibrium together with (30) yields a steady–state wage








￿￿￿ if   #

$!
￿￿￿ if   ##

$!#
￿￿￿ if   #￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
(19)
Thissteady–statewageprofileoverskillsimpliesaparticularage–wageprofile(seeFigure1). Early
in agents’ lives their skill level is low, and they receive a correspondingly low wage 
 relative
to output — this also reflects the relatively low opportunity cost of schooling. Once their skill
level grows beyond #, their wages begin to grow at a rate exceeding overall productivity growth,
reflecting the additional specialized skills acquired on the job. Finally, once their skill level has
risen beyond # their wages cease to grow faster than the economy.19
— FIGURE 1 GOES HERE —



















Notethat intermediates arenot used symmetrically in production, but instead diffusethroughout the
economy as the skills required to implement them evolve. As the following proposition illustrates,
the impact of technology and skill on aggregate labor productivity exhibits bounded complemen-
tarity:
Proposition 2: In the short–run, labor productivity growth may be driven by  technological
progress  rising human capital. However , sustained growth in labor productivity requires 
technological progress 	
 human capital accumulation.
To illustrate, suppose we shut down the education sector, so that     , but let  
As long as the maximum skill in the economy exceeds the skill requirement of the most recently
introduced technology,  ￿￿, technological progress will result in rising labor productivity
due to increasing returns to specialization. However, eventually it will be the case that   ￿￿
Beyond this point the skills needed to implement further innovations no longer exist and growth
￿￿ Note that ￿￿￿￿ represents the time period when cohort ￿ starts to experience rising relative wages, and ￿￿￿￿ represents the time period when
cohort ￿ stops experiencing rising relative wages. Wages rise throughout their lifetime, but just rise relatively rapidly in the between these two time
periods.
12must cease. Conversely, suppose we shut down the R&D sector so that   , but let  . In this
case, skill accumulation may raise labor productivity by allowing a more efficient usage of existing
intermediate technologies in final production. However, as  grows relative to  it will eventually
be the case that the skill–constraints on the use of intermediates in final production no longer bind,
and their marginal products are equalized.20 Beyond this point, production efficiency cannot be
improved any further and growth must cease.
3. Endogenous Growth
In this section, we embed the production structure described in Section 2 in a dynamic general
equilibrium model of endogenous growth. In particular, we characterize the balanced growth paths
that arise when labour is allocated optimally across activities. In Section 4, we illustrate the impli-
cations of this model for the effectiveness of growth–promoting policies and the interpretation of
recent empirical analyses of growth.
3.1 Intertemporal Optimization
We consider a closed economy in which households have identical preferences over a single final





￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
&'	' (21)
where (   i st h er a t eo fp u r et i m ep r e f e r e n c ea n d&  ' is their time ' consumption. The
final good is the numeraire. As described above, each household is composed of an infinite stream
of continuously overlapping generations. Households can borrow or lend freely at the equilibrium
instantaneous interest rate )', there is no utility of leisure and children do not inherit the human
capital of their parents. It follows that although consumption and schooling decisions are made by
the household, we can break the optimization problem down into two steps.
First, household member * chooses the length of time in school, , so as to maximize his/her
contribution to household wealth. The resulting lifetime wealth of the *th successor of the current
￿￿ With rising intermediate productivity, the efficient allocation of intermediates requires that price differences reflect only productivity differences
(see Section 5).
13household member is given by
+*  
￿







￿ )  -  	- representsthediscountfactor, 
*'isthetime' wagerateofthecurrent
household member’s *th successor. A second–order condition must also hold (see below).
Second,ahouseholdwhosecurrentmemberwasbornattime maximizesutility(21)subject















.    (23)
where . is the current value of the household’s assets and ￿￿￿￿￿￿. 
Household assets consist of claims to the profits streams of intermediate firms. The value of
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 (24)
The reward toinvestment in R&D is a claim, withvalue 0 , to the profits of intermediate firms
that use the technology. From (32), the labor used to produce one new technology (  )i s
 and each unit of labor costs 
￿. With free entry into the sector, the equilibrium value of this







Given initial stocks of transferrable skill, , and frontier knowledge, ,acompetitive equi-
librium for this economy satisfies the following conditions:
 Final goods producers choose intermediates to maximize profits, (2).
 Intermediate producers set prices and hire labor so as to maximize profits, (3) and (4).
 Workers allocate themselves to the labor market which offers the highest wage for their skill.
 Households choose the optimal amount of schooling for each cohort, (22).
 Households allocate consumption over time so as to maximize (21), subject to (22) and (23).
With time separable log–utility and perfect capital markets, the consumption of each household,






 )  ( (26)
 Firms in the R&D sector earn zero profits, (25).
 The final goods market clears. Since the final good is the numeraire and the economy is closed,
this implies that
1    (27)
Theasset market clears. Differentiating (24)with respecttotimeyieldsthenoarbitragecondition,
which requires that the rate of return on all firm shares must equal the rateof interest (see Grossman








where / is the total profit of intermediate firms using the most recently introduced technology,
.21
 The labor market clears: (13), (14) and (15) hold, and the market for each skill–level clears.
3.3 Stationary Growth Paths
We now characterize the stationary competitive growth paths for this economy. Along such a path
the distribution of skills is given by (11), and the individual labor market clearing conditions are






























The variable 2 measures the impact of the steady–state labor market equilibrium on the incentives
both to invest in education and to invest in R&D. The first term is the portion of time each cohort
spendsinschoolandthesecondtermreflectsthegrowthrateinthewagesduringaworker’slifetime.
The larger is 2 the greater is the incentive for individual households to invest in education. This
is because (a) the more time individuals spend in school the fewer low-skilled workers in the labor
￿￿ Note that it must be the case in equilibrium that ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿ This distribution of skills and the associated labor market equilibrium conditions are correct only along a stationary growth path.
15forceand thegreater thereturns to scarceskills, and (b) thegreater is the growth in wages thehigher
are the net returns from education. In contrast, the larger is 2 the less incentive firms have to invest
in R&D. This is because (a) the more time individuals spend in school, the smaller is the labor force
and, hence, the lower is the size of the market, and (b) the greater is the relative cost of skilled labor,
the lower are the net profits from innovation. Note that increased on the job learning  raises the
opportunity costs of schooling, but slackens the constraints associated with skill, thereby reducing
the opportunity cost of research.
Along a stationary growth path, ,  and 2 are constant. This implies that
Proposition 3: Along a balanced growth path, frontier knowledge must grow at the same rate as
transferrable knowledge:
   (30)
Although the stock of frontier knowledge strictly exceeds that of transferrable knowledge (i.e. 
 ), (30) implies that both frontier and transferrable knowledge must grow at the same rate in a
steady state. If this were not the case, say if  , theskill constraints wouldbecomemorebinding
over time as the gap between new and transferrable knowledge expands. This would increase 2,
reflecting an increase in the returns to investment in human capital and an increase in the relative
cost of R&D. It follows that  w o u l dt e n dt oi n c r e a s e ,a n dwould tend to decrease over time. This
strengthens the result in proposition 2: when labor allocations are endogenized, not only are both
types of knowledge accumulation necessary for sustained growth, but both must grow at the same
rate.
>From this, we also derive that despite the non–symmetric use of intermediates, labor produc-









This is also the growth rate of the wage associated with a given skill level over time.
3.4 The Unconstrained Growth Path
Along an unconstrained growth path, the labor market equilibrium is such that the measure of
workers engaged in R&D is strictly less than the measure capable of doing so #  .I tf o l l o w s
16that (15) holds with a strict inequality. This also implies that the wage in research will be exactly
equal to the highest wage in production (
￿  
#. The unshaded area 34 in Figure 2
illustrates the combinations of  and 2 that are consistent with such a labor market equilibrium.
Correspondingly, the boundary 4 represents combinations of  and 2 which yield a labor market
equilibria in which all workers who are capable of working in the R&Dsector are doing so (  #).








Along this 4 boundary, high growth is associated with low values of 2 because high rates of
innovation can only be sustained by high levels of education that serve to compress the dispersion
of skills.
Combining (4), (13), (25), (26), (27), (28) and (31) yields the stationary combinations of  and
2 such that the expected benefits from the marginal innovation are just equal to the labor costs of











and is depicted as the ,5 curve in Figure 2. One can interpret the ,5 curve as being analogous
to a relative demand curve for growth in new skills. The schedule is downward sloping reflecting
the fact that, in equilibrium, investment in R&D, , depends negatively on the cost of skilled labor
relative to that used in production, which is reflected by 2.G i v e n2the rate of innovation depends
positively on the productivity of R&D labor, , and the size of the population, 23 An increase
in either of these variables will cause the ,5 schedule to shift up and to the right. Note that if
2  , implying no wage dispersion in production and no education sector, this equation would be
identical to that in Grossman and Helpman (1991, p. 61).
Solving (22), and using (26) and (31), yields the household’s optimal schooling condition in
steady state:















￿￿ Note however that the model can easily be adapted to allow for population growth (see Section 5).
17Rearranging (34) yields the stationary combinations of  and 2 such that the optimal schooling





















where, from (7) and (8),
    
￿
￿￿￿ (36)
This is depicted as the ET curve in Figure 2. One can interpret the 6 curve as being analogous to
a relative supply curve of growth in labor force skills.
Lemma 1: Along the ET curve, 2 and  are positively related.
The 6 curve is upward sloping because household increments to human capital, , depend posi-
tively on the expected value of future wages relative to the current cost of acquiring human capital.
Given 2, the growth rate in the supply of skills depends positively on the rate of absorption, ,t h e
productivity of education,  and , and lifespan, . An increase in any of these variables will
cause the 6 curve to shift up and to the left.
— FIGURE 2 GOES HERE —
Along the unconstrained growth path, the equilibrium rates of innovation and skill acquisition,
￿  
￿ and labor market tightness, 2
￿, are determined by the intersection of the ,5 and 6
curves, as illustrated in Figure 2. In equilibrium, it is the relative returns to education and to R&D
whichensurethatgrowthinbothfactorsisequalized. Thefollowingpropositionprovidesconditions
which guarantee that the two curves intersect in the region 34:
Proposition 4: If

(    
 (37)

















18then an unconstrained steady–state growth path exists and is unique.
Uniqueness follows from the fact that the ,5 curve is downward sloping and the 6 curve is
upward sloping. The condition on parameters given in (37) ensures that the ,5 curve lies above
zero when   . Since the 6 curve passes through the origin (
￿  ), the two curves
must intersect in the positive quadrant. Condition (38) ensures that the intersection must be within
the boundary 4 and condition (39) ensures that the optimal schooling choice is a maximum.24
Note that both the existence and the uniqueness of the balanced growth path stem from the bounded
complementarity between technology and human capital implicit in our model.
3.5 The Constrained Growth Path
An unconstrained equilibrium does not exist for all parameter values. In particular, it is possible
that, at the maximum production wage, the demand for R&D workers would exceed the supply
of those who are capable of working in that sector. Equilibrium then requires that all sufficiently
skilled workers work in the R&D sector (#    ). This implies that (14) holds with equality,
and that the R&D wage is bid up above the highest production wage, 
￿  
. Along such a
constrained growth path,t h e,5 curve in (33) is no longer relevant because for a given distrib-
ution of skills, the supply of agents with constrains the level of activity in the R&D sector.
Instead, free entry into the R&D sector and asset market equilibrium together determine the wage
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 (40)
The supply curve for new skills growth (35) is replaced by an ‘‘adjusted’’ inverse relative supply
curve of new skills, which captures the fact that that the greater is ￿￿
￿ ￿ , the lower the maximum–
minimumwageratiointheproductionsectorrequiredtoinduceagiveninvestmentinhumancapital,
. Note that R&D incentives affect the long–run growth rate only indirectly by raising the returns
to human capital accumulation via
￿￿
￿ and thereby inducing a greater supply of skills.
￿￿ In fact, this condition is stronger than the sufficient condition derived in the appendix.
194. Implications
In this section, we highlight some of the implications of our model. Since our growth process nests
thoseimpliedbyothermodels, manystandardresultsinthegrowthliteraturealsoapplyhere, atleast
qualitatively. Consequently, we focus only on implications that are specific to our framework. Not
surprisingly, in contrast to models with a single primary engine of growth, factors that affect both
R&D and human capital accumulation have effects on growth. However, the nature of these growth
effects reflect the crucial role of bounded complementarity within our model. In order for a factor
to increase growth, it must not only increase the rate of accumulation of one type of knowledge, but
also induce an accompanying increase in the accumulation of the other type of knowledge. Without
this induced response, higher growth could not be sustained. If, however, that were this comple-
mentaritynotbounded, growthwouldbeexplosive. Moreprecisely, factorswhichdirectlystimulate
innovation (e.g. R&D productivity, ) raise the returns to investment in education, which induces
the necessary supporting increase in education. Similarly, factors which directly stimulate increased
investment in education (e.g. the quality of education, ) raise the returns to investment in R&D,
thereby inducing the expansion of technology that gives the additional human capital value.
4.1 Policy Implications
Suppose the government introduces subsidies to R&D and education and finances them through
lump–sum taxation. If the government pays a fraction 7 of R&Dcosts and a fraction 8 of schooling





The free entry condition in the R&D sector (25) is now replaced by
0 

 ￿   7

 (42)
















































Growth responds positively to both types of subsidy. However, the fact that both technological
change and human capital accumulation are necessary for growth means that, although the menu
of possible policy instruments is expanded, the effectiveness of any individual instrument used in
isolation is diminished:
Proposition 5:
(a) The long–run effectiveness of R&D subsidies is constrained by the responsiveness of education
to the growth in demand for skills.
(b) The long–run effectiveness of education subsidies is constrained by the responsiveness of R&D
to the growth in supply of skills.
These implications can be understood using Figure 3. In the left panel, an R&D subsidy causes
the ,5 curve to shift to the right. In the standard innovation–based growth model, the 6 curve
would behorizontal, reflecting the perfect technological mobility of labor. The effect of the subsidy
on growth would be to increase it from ￿ to ￿. However, in our model, absorptive capacity on the
job is bounded, so that a long–run increasein growth can only be supported if human capital growth
alsorises. This isaccomplishedbytheendogenous risein therelativereturns to schooling, butsince
this also raises the relative costs of R&D, the increase in growth is partially offset and the actual
long–run growth rate increases only as far as ￿.
Conversely, in the right panel, a subsidy to education causes the ET curve to shift to the right.
In a human capital–based growth model, the ,5 curve would be horizontal, reflecting the costless
introduction of technology. The effect of the subsidy would be to increase growth from ￿
￿ to ￿
￿.
However, inourmodeltheincreasein productivitythatcan beobtainedby increasinghumancapital
onagivensetoftechnologiesisbounded,sothatalong–runincreaseingrowthcanonlybesustained
ifnewtechnologies aredevelopedandadopted. Thisisaccomplishedbytheendogenousincreasein
21the relative return to R&D, but since this also reduces the relative returns to schooling, the increase
in growth is partially offset and the growth rate increase only as far as ￿
￿.
— FIGURE 3 GOES HERE —
4.2 The Empirical Link between Schooling and Growth
The expression for optimal schooling (34) is similar to that derived by Bils and Klenow (1999,
equation 16). This should not be surprising given that they are both based on the same Mincerian
model of schooling. However, there are some important differences. Theirs is a partial equilibrium
analysis,withafixedinterestrate,inwhichexpectedproductivitygrowthentersthroughitseffecton
discounting. Inourgeneralequilibriumanalysis, undertheassumptionoflogpreferences,thiseffect
is not present because the interest rate fully adjusts in response to high consumption growth: ) 
￿  (. As a consequence, productivity growth affects schooling through its equilibrium impact on
incentives via labor market tightness, 2. Technological change affects schooling decisions not only
through the valuation of future wages via discounting, but also through affecting wages and returns
to education directly.25 This more direct effect of technological change on educational investments
is a consequence of bounded complementarity between education and technology.
The relationship between schooling and growth in our model also differs from that discussed by
Bils and Klenow for other reasons. First, in our basic model, wages rise with skill only because
higher skills are increasingly scarce.26 This implies an obsolescence effect whereby an individual’s
wage growth depends on the rate at which he/she learns relative t ot h eg r o w t hi nt h eh u m a nc a p i t a l
of the most recent graduates   . Second, firms have monopoly power so that households do
not appropriate the full static returns from their investments (
 ). Finally, individuals’ wages
grow relative to GDP for only a portion of an individual’s lifetime (2 ).
4.3 The Catch–Up Effect
Nelson and Phelps (1966) posit that human capital accumulates faster, the further it is behind the
technological frontier. Jones (1999) captures this idea in a reduced form way in accounting for
￿￿ In our model, we could allow for both effects by assuming CES preferences, in which case ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿.
￿￿ When intermediate productivity rises with skill, wages also depend on own human capital.
22post–war US economic growth. The human capital accumulation and innovation processes that he
specifies have these effects imposed exogenously. Indeed, because he treats the allocations of labor
effort to education and R&D as exogenous, this is the only way such a catch up effect could arise.
In contrast, the catch–up effect arises endogenously in our model both in human capital investment
and innovation — rapid accumulation of one type of knowledge stimulates accumulation of the
other type of knowledge via the distribution of wages. This effect again reflects the importance of
endogenizing both schooling (as highlighted by Bils and Klenow, 1999) and innovation .
Relatedly, the modelalso implies that economies which growfastest in steadystate arealsothose
with the smallest gap between the frontier knowledge generated by a given R&D technology, and
the transferrable knowledge generated by the education sector. Rosenberg (2000) argues that the
post–war growth success of the U.S relative to other countries was related to the responsiveness of
its universities to the technological frontier in terms of subject matter and curriculum.
4.4 The Relationship Between Growth and Intergenerational Wage Dispersion
Our basic model has predictions regarding the relationship between intergenerational wage disper-
sionandthesourcesofgrowthdifferencesacrosscountries. Ifgrowthdifferencesarepredominantly
dueto differencesin thequalityoftheeducational system, , fastergrowingeconomies shouldhave
flatterexperiencewageprofiles. However,iftheyarepredominantlyduetodifferencesinR&Dpro-
ductivity or differences in the ease of technology adoption, , faster growing economies will tend
to have steeper experience wage profiles.27 Bils and Klenow (1999) find no significant relationship
between growth and intergenerational wage dispersion. They interpret this as evidence against a
large effect of variations in schooling quality on growth. However in our model with its second en-
gine of growth, this finding is more difficult to interpret, since both differences in educational and
R&D quality have conflicting consequences for the relationship between intergenerational wage
dispersion and growth. In particular if, as seems plausible, high growth economies tend to dom-
inate along both dimensions, the two effects would offset each other and be hard to disentangle
empirically.
￿￿ The latter prediction is, in part, a result of the assumption that individuals learn at a constant rate throughout their lives. In Section 5, we discuss
how the results change if absorptive capacity declines with age.
234.5 The Role of Lifespan
Heckman and Klenow (1997) and Bils and Klenow (1999) argue that longer lifespan stimulates
educational investment because it implies a longer time over which to reap the benefits. In our
model, lifespan also has another general equilibrium effect — it generates a scale effect, raising the
innovation rate and the returns to education. Increased lifespan increases the amount of knowledge
that can be learned on the job. This additional skill accumulation increases the supply of skilled
workers, depresses the cost of innovation, and ultimately speeds up growth. Although, with zero
population growth, the effect of lifespan cannot be distinguished from the overall scale effect, when
we adapt the model so as to mitigate the scale effect and allow for population growth, the distinct
effect of lifespan becomes clear (see Section 5).
5. Extensions to the Basic Model
5.1 Rising Intermediate Productivity
In the basic model, output growth arises from increasing returns to specialization in intermediate
goods. The only distinction between technologies is their skill requirement — more recently intro-
duced technologies have higher marginal productivities only because there is a limited supply of
specialized labor with the requisite skill. However, more realistically, for a given quantity of labor,
newer technologies might be expected to be inherently more productive than older ones. Qualita-
tively speaking, all of the previous results generalize when we allow intermediate productivity to
rise over time.
Suppose that technology  produces ￿ units of intermediate goods and services from each unit
























The labor market equilibrium conditions can be derived in a similar fashion to that previously de-
24scribed, by simply re–formulating the arguments in terms of ‘‘productivity–adjusted’’ demand for
labor with skill :
 













For low skill levels, the demand for labor from intermediates using the associated technology, com-
pletely exhausts the available supply without driving the wage above that earned by higher–skilled
workers. However, there exists a skill level # above which the productivity adjusted supply of labor
with skill index , !
￿￿
￿￿￿ is less than the productivity–adjusted supply of labor with skills ;
divided equally across technologies, #. It follows that, in equilibrium, an equal productivity–
adjusted quantity of labor is allocated to each technology   #, and that the actual quantity
of labor using technology  must be  ￿
￿
￿￿
￿￿￿!#. Since this exceeds !, the remainder is drawn
from the pool of workers with skills greater than  that are not being used in the R&D sector,











￿￿￿!# if   #
































  #   (51)
The associated wage profile is qualitatively similar to (13), except that the elasticity of the wage
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This equilibrium growth path is very similar to that without rising intermediate productivity, and all
of the implications remain qualitatively unchanged. An increase in the size of productivity incre-
ments raises the incentives to invest in R&D causing the modified ,5 schedule (52) to shift up.
Similarly, it raises the return to an increment in the skill level shifting the modified 6 schedule
(53) to the right. The combined effect induce greater productivity growth. As (54) shows, the im-
pact of technological change on productivity growth can be decomposed into two parts: an effect
due to the returns to specialization associated with more technologies in production, and an effect
due to the increasing productivity of these technologies.
5.2 Population Growth
Ourbasicmodelexhibitsastandardscaleeffect—growthincreaseswiththesizeofthepopulation.28
Althoughthescaleeffectdiminishes asthepopulationgrows, becauseitispartly divertedinto rising
wage costs in R&D, sustained population growth still places the economy on an explosive growth
path. However, it is straightforward to adapt the model to allow for population growth without
changing the results qualitatively.
We assume that the cohort born at time  has measure    and that growth in the number
of agents born is given by - This implies that the size of the cohort born at time  is  ￿￿
Then, the cohort of age  at time  has measure  ￿ ￿￿. It follows that the total labor












and the experience distribution is described by
    
 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (56)
As before, in the steady state, the time  skill of an agent of age  is   ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ and a
￿￿ Jones (1995) has argued that this kind of scale effect is inconsistent with the available evidence.
26change of variable yields the distribution of skills given by
 
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 (58)
and support ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Note again that this is a single–peaked density function. In the basic
model without population growth, more skilled workers are scarce because they are more special-
ized and therefore spread over a broader range of technologies. Now, beyond this specialization,
highly skilled workers become relatively more scarce as larger generations of young, less experi-
enced workers enter the economy.
Following Y oung (1998) and Howitt (1999), we assume that the scale effect is mitigated by the
proliferation of final goods. Specifically we assume that increments in the number of final products
is proportional to the population:
   < (59)
Since the population growth rate is constant, the number of workers per industry < converges
monotonically to the constant: -We assume that this convergence has already occurred, so that
<  - Increasing the number of final goods does not affect aggregate output, but does imply
that labor must be more finely divided across industries. Since research is industry specific, the














With these changes, the stationary combinations of 2 and  which are consistent with free entry
in the R&D sector are described by a modified ,5 curve. If population growth is small, this curve



















Increased population growth unambiguously shifts this modified ,5 curve up and to the right.
Stationary combinations of 2 and  which are consistent with the optimal schooling decision are
d e s c r i b e db yam o d i f i e d6 curve. This modified 6 schedule is quite similar to that without
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 (62)
where  is given by (36). Increased population growth has an ambiguous impact of the 6
curve.
Introducing population growth in the manner described here does not qualitatively change the
results discussed in Section 4. For small population growth rates, productivity growth is increasing
with population growth. However, for larger values of -, the impact of population growth on per
capita income growth is not unambiguously positive. This ambiguity arises since a fast growing
population raises the relative cost of education by magnifying the relative scarcity of older more
skilledworkers, offsettingtheeffectsofpopulationgrowth onR&D.Thisresultcontrastswithother
models of ‘‘growth without scale effects’’. Note finally that, as suggested earlier, a scale effect due
to lifespan  remains, even though the cohort–size scale effect is removed.
5.3 Old Dogs and New Tricks
In our basic model we assume that, once they enter the work force, agents acquire further skills
through on the job learning throughout their lives. Suppose instead that for an agent born at time
 learning initially occurs at a rate , but that at some age ￿ learning stops.29 This captures the
reductioninlearninginasimpleway. Itfollowsthatthetimeskilllevelofaworkerwithexperience
   is
	

 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ if   ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ if   ￿
(63)
The resulting impact of experience on human capital can be viewed as a proxy for the quadratic
term typically assumed in Mincerian wage equations. Although skills never actually decumulate




Assume that ￿    so that the oldest generation has learned enough to have higher
skills relative to the youngest (this need not be the case). Then, the support of the time t distribution
￿￿ That the learning rate falls to zero simplifies the exposition, but we could alternatively have assumed some positive rate less than ￿.
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￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿ otherwise (66)
Notethatthedistributionofskillsremainssingle–peaked, so that Proposition 1isstill applicable.
In equilibrium, if we looked at a cross–section of ages in a given time period, wages would initially
rise relative to GDP , and then fall with age. In this modified version of the model, R&D investment
incentives are not much altered. Moreover, although an agent’s lifetime wage profile is somewhat
different, so long as on–the–job learning continues for a sufficient time period after graduation,
their basic incentives are not that much altered either.30 Consequently, one can show (see Appendix
B) that an equilibrium growth path which is qualitatively similar to that characterized in Section 3
continues to exist.
6. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have constructed a model in which technologies and skills are bounded com-
plements in the determination of the growth process. As a result, growth cannot proceed without
both types of knowledge accumulation, and both innovation and skill acquisition depend on pri-
vate incentives to make costly investments. Our model captures two important intuitions: that both
the distribution of skills and wages are endogenous, generated by the response of individuals to
the incentives generated by technological change, and that the amount of innovation depends on the
relativescarcityand hencethecostofskill. Inaddition, to providingageneral frameworkforunder-
standing the interactions between technological progress, human capital formation and productivity
growth, our model has unique implications for the effectiveness of growth–enhancing policies, for
the interpretation of the link between growth and schooling, and for other features of the growth
process.
￿￿ The analysis is somewhat tedious, but follows the same steps as before. The experience wage profile now consists of 5 parts. Relative to GDP ,
wages are constant initialy, then grow plateauing at a maximum. After learning stops, the wage then falls relative to GDP , before becoming constant
again.
29In its most limited sense, our model might be interpreted as a model of a leading–edge devel-
oped economy. Less developed economies do not engage in much frontier R&D, but rather acquire
existing technologies from abroad. Jovanovic (1997) argues that a model of adoption (e.g. Parente,
1994) is a more appropriate characterization for LDCs than innovation–based models of growth.
However, the initial adoption of new technologies is costly.31 That LDC governments are aware
of this is evidenced by the significant allocation of resources towards research extension services
(see Hoff, Braverman and Stiglitz, 1990). In a more general model with international technology
spillovers (along the lines of Howitt, 2000), one could re–interpret our R&D sector as an initial
adoption sector which procures technologies internationally and engages in their costly adoption.
Once the initial adoption costs have been incurred, it becomes possible for the knowledge to dis-
seminate throughout the economy, and eventually to find its way into the education system. This
process exactly parallels the evolution of knowledge explored in this paper.
￿￿ Grossman and Helpman (1991) emphasize that the costs of immitation may often be almost as high as those of innovation.
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Combining (A2) and (A4) yields:
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        2 (A6)
Since in a steady state,     is constant, and it follows from (A2) that  ##  . Along the
steady state growth path the r.h.s. of (A6) is constant so that  ##   From (29), if 2 is constant
in the steady state it must be the case that  ##  # # and so   
Growth in Labor Productivity: Integrating over labor demands as follows yields the following ex-



























































Since along the steady–state growth path both # and ## are constant and ￿ ￿








The 4 Boundary:IfallagentsthatareavailableforR&Darebeing used inthatsector, then#  
and
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Substituting for # using (A6) and rearranging yields (33).

























where     ,    
    denotes the dynamic spillover, and ' and ' are
defined by
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32The present value of the lifetime steady–state earnings of an agent born at time  is thus given by
+
￿ ￿ ￿ 
￿ ￿ ￿

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But along the steady–state growth path ￿￿￿￿   
  ￿￿. Hence, the first–order





















    (
 
￿￿￿ (A23)

































33Dividing both sides by 
￿￿￿￿
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￿￿￿  Also we know that ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
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where the last equality follows from (36). Rearranging yields (39).
Proof of Lemma 1:
Case 1: Suppose   
￿




















￿￿￿  . Note that .￿   and
=￿  . Also observe that existence requires that .=  .L e t
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since   .=  .S i n c e ￿   , it follows that along the ET curve 	2	  
Case 2: Suppose   
￿
















































Since ￿   and =￿  , a sufficient condition for
￿"
￿￿   is that the term in square brackets
is non–positive. Let    .=  .T h e n
￿"
￿￿   if
   
 
  (A39)








￿￿$  . It follows that (A39) must hold with strict inequality for all  
35Hence, in this case as well 	2	  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38Appendix B: Extensions
This appendix provides the mathematical details for the extensions of the basic model discussed in
Section 5. The steps involved are very much the same as for the basic model.
1. Rising Intermediate Productivity
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where the second step uses (29)

































Differentiating w.r.t. time yields (54).
The ,5 Schedule: Themaximumwageinproductionisnow
  
    $
￿￿￿ #￿￿￿￿￿￿.
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￿￿￿￿￿ using (A45) and rearranging yields (52)
























where     ,    
    and ' and ' are defined as in (A17) and (A18).
Following the same steps as for the basic model, and noting that along the balanced growth path
￿￿￿￿ 
     












































Substituting (A52) and (A53) into (A51) and rearranging as before yields (53).
2. Population Growth
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where 2 is defined as before (29).
The 4 Boundary: In a constrained equilibrium we know that ￿"      . Substitution





































































































































































































where   ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ denotes the birth rate and :  ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ denotes the death rate. Letting -   so
that   ￿￿￿ 
 - yields (61).
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where  "     
 and ' and ' are defined as in (A17) and (A18).
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and the ET schedule can be expressed as in (62).



































































































































Substituting for # using (A81) and rearranging yields the same RD schedule as before (33).
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      ,    
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The present value of the lifetime steady–state earnings of an agent born at time  is thus given by
+
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But along the steady–state growth path ￿￿￿￿   
  ￿￿. Hence, the first–order
























Substituting for # using (A77) and integrating yields
































 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿%  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
  











































































































0 12 01 2